

The paradox of political dynasties of regeneration type and poverty in regional autonomy era

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Paradox of
political
dynasties

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Abstract

Purpose – This paper aims to identify some key points about the practice of political dynasties and poverty in the era of regional autonomy through literature studies.

Design/methodology/approach – This research uses literature study method and is organized into three parts. The first is to elaborate reflections on regional autonomy, political dynasty and substantive poverty. The second is to decipher the reality and the practice of political dynasty in the era of regional autonomy and poverty level. The third is to analyze the political dynasty and poverty in the era of regional autonomy. The last is the policy advices.

Findings – The start of dynastic leadership began before the era of direct elections in 2005 and continued after the direct elections, so that the decentralization system provided space to build a political dynasty. Regional autonomy poses the risk of full control by local elites and the birth of local ruling elites, or it indicates the presence of local elite dominance both economically and politically in the region. The autonomy era had an impact on the decrease of poverty in the area of regeneration political dynasty. This is evidenced by the decrease in the percentage of poverty index from year to year, although not yet out of the category of poor areas (based on national index), or only 4 regions from 12 regions that belong to non-poor areas. Although the average dynasties count is able to reduce poverty each year, the income distribution in majority of the political dynasty regions is uneven.

Originality/value – This research is a preliminary study on the political dynasty of regeneration type in Indonesia which is a hot issue in the era of regional autonomy as well as can add empirical evidence about the debate about political dynasty and poverty.

Keywords Poverty, Political dynasty, Regional autonomy, Type of political dynasty

Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction

The era of regional autonomy provides some authority to the regions to determine programs and activities which are appropriate to the needs of their communities (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1999). Usually it includes fiscal, administrative and political aspects (Abimanyu and Megantara, 2009 in Nurhemi, 2015). However, regional autonomy also poses a risk of full control by local elites and the beginning of local ruling elites (Tanzi, 1995; Hofman and Kaiser, 2002). Act No. 12/2008 (Amendment to Act No. 32/2004) and Act No. 9/2015 (Amendment to Act No. 23/2014) on Regional Government resulted in a direct election system of regional heads and post-cancellation of ban for incumbent family (Article 7r, Act No. 8 of 2015) by the Constitutional Court (Adjudgment of the Constitutional Court No. 33/PUU-XII/2015) which states that Article 7r is contradictory to

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Article 28J (2) of the 1945 Constitution increasingly giving fresh wind to the practice of political dynasty.

The political dynasty is a regional political power which is run or involves a group of people who have filiation or kinship (those who inherit the same public office from family members before them; in other words a small number of families dominate the power; Querrubin, 2011; *Asako et al., 2015; Sujarwoto, 2015*). Putnam (1976) quoted in *Sujarwoto (2015)* explained that poverty alleviation efforts and good governance will fail if bureaucratic disease expansion (patronage, cronyism and nepotism) occurs. In addition, *Bardhan and Mokherjee (2005)* in their research on decentralization and anti-poverty in India found three serious threats to elite capture in local government-designed programs: First, resource corruption by local governments used for the benefit of elite groups or certain political dynasties. Second, the inefficiency of allocations in which the resulting policies and programs are not properly targeted or misappropriated; for example, in the case of poverty alleviation programs, allocations are directed to certain elite groups and not to the most needy groups of people. Finally, dynasties cause unhealthy institutions and harm the institution itself. *Sujarwoto (2015)* also proved that political dynasties are bad for poverty alleviation in Indonesia, illustrated by the percentage of poverty in districts/municipalities held by political dynasties higher than those of non-political dynasties.

However, political dynasties are not necessarily bad in the eyes of the public. *Besley and Reynal-Querol (2013)* on political selection through the dynasties found that the dynasty would end by itself when the economic performance of the dynastic leadership was bad, whereas the citizens would receive dynastic leadership whenever their economic performance was good. In addition, *Mendoza et al. (2013, 2014, 2016)* proved that dynasties do not affect the poverty; political dynasties do not reduce or increase poverty. They argued that non-political dynasties do not present themselves as viable alternatives to political dynasties, but poverty strengthens the political dynasty. However, there is a relation between the political dynasty and the socioeconomic aspect, in which political dynasties are scattered in areas with relatively high poverty. The decline in poverty and inequality in income distribution is a direct and indirect impact of fiscal decentralization policies in which local governments play an important role through open and direct policies (*Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2011*).

The Ministry of Home Affairs of Indonesia noted that there are at least 58 regions indicated in political dynasties by 2013, some of which are political dynasties of regeneration or a region led by people who are still in family relationships in relay (regeneration type). Evaluation in governance needs to be done to assess performance improvement efforts to support the achievement of regional autonomy goals, especially in the implementation of regional autonomy and poverty alleviation. The question is as follows:

- Q1. Does regional autonomy actually create a strong political dynasty (regeneration type) and does regional autonomy actually increase poverty especially in the area of political dynasties (regeneration type)?

By those reasons, this paper aims to identify some key points about the practice of political dynasties (regeneration type) and poverty in the era of regional autonomy. In understanding the paradoxical context of political dynasty and poverty in the era of regional autonomy, this paper is organized into three parts. The first is to elaborate reflections on regional autonomy, political dynasty and substantive poverty. The second is to decipher the reality and practice of political dynasty in the era of regional autonomy and poverty level. The third

is to analyze political dynasty and poverty in the era of regional autonomy. The last is closing and policy suggestions.

2. Research method

This research uses literature study method. The data were obtained from research reports, journals, mass media, magazines, books, reinforced secondary data from Regional Government Budget (APBD) from the Directorate General of Balanced Funds, and poverty data from Central Bureau of Statistic (BPS). Various literatures are used as a source of reference to see the issue of political dynasties, regional autonomy, poverty alleviation and various content issues occurring in the region.

3. Result and discussion

3.1 *About political dynasty*

Dynasty is a class of sovereigns or rulers, whose succession is determined by blood relationship (Scruton, 2007). If simplified political dynasties are a political regime that exercises power from generation to generation, based on kinship or family. The political regime is formed due to the high attention among family members towards politics and aims to gain power and maintain for as long as possible.

In developing post-colonial countries, the political system of democracy is the best choice in the administration of government in accordance with the objectives of the state. Agustino (2014) explained that although post-colonial countries have adopted the democratic system and abandoned the traditional political system, the kinship and familial factors are still very strong in political life and the practice of familial importance has become an ideology for leaders in both national-level post-colonial state and regions. Mair (1991) quoted in Agustino (2014) explained that the family is a biological group and also a social group that has a permanent membership, because it is linked through the aspect of descent, marriage or adoptive family, so given the primary responsibility, namely, responsibility for achieving economic status, social and political aspirations, and embody a sense of closeness to each other.

Clubok, Wilensky and Beghorn in Pasan (2013) explained that there are several forms of political dynasties in contemporary political contexts, i.e.:

- Finer forms by encouraging incumbent families to continue to hold power democratically;
- The form of political dynasty that has been adapted to modern democratic ethics is to prepare their family members in the early education and political recruitment system. The appearance of family members in the next period is not due to blood and family factors but due to reasonable and rational factors of politics; and
- The open and identical forms of authoritarianism emerging from the modern political system are conditioned in such a way that one can only choose the child/wife of the ruling family, so the person chosen is not on a voluntary but repressive basis.

In addition, the political culture in Indonesia has interesting characteristics, one of which is a political culture that places the position of political behavior with the form of political dynasty as an eternal power. The political dynasty displays the power of the status quo through its family, in other words indicating that the close relative or family is a tool to form a strong power or family as a power embryo (Izazi in Suyadi, 2014). Dal Bó *et al.* (2009)

argued that candidates with relatively longer periods have more kinship in the future, meaning substantially the difference from the formed of political dynasties to leaders serving a period with longer serving leaders.

There are many definitions of political dynasties included in [Scruton \(2007\)](#); [Querrubin \(2011\)](#); [Agustino \(2014\)](#), [Asako et al. \(2015\)](#); [Evangelio and Abocejo \(2015\)](#), [Sujarwato \(2015\)](#), which have the similar main point that political dynasty in essence constitutes a small number of families who dominate power.

Political dynasty can be divided into several characteristics; [Halim \(2014\)](#) classified political dynasties into two types, namely, the vertical political dynasty, as the Regional Head passes his position to one relative or family based on the lineage, and the horizontal political dynasty, when some Head of Region in a region has a familial relationship ([Figure 1](#)).

Meanwhile, according to the Monitoring of the Implementation of Regional Autonomy (KPPOD), there are three types of political dynasties developing in Indonesia; the first is the political dynasty of regeneration, in which there is one family lead without pause. Second is inter-room political dynasty in which the executive and legislature are occupied by one family. The third is inter-region political dynasty or political octopus, where a family holds strategic positions in different regions of province ([Figure 2](#)).

If it refers to one type of political dynasty that is the type of regeneration (vertical), borrowing [Olson's \(1993\)](#) stationary bandits term, appointing relatives or relatives to political hands to capture politics and exploit the economy. So the local ruling elite builds a political dynasty (type of regeneration) with the aim of continuing the power, by encouraging his family to run for successor after his tenure is over so that all the cases in the district are under his control.

3.2 Regional autonomy and poverty

The implementation of regional autonomy refers to the principles of regional autonomy as stipulated in Act no. 33/2004, including the following:




Figure 1.
Type of political
dynasty

Source: Halim (2014)




Figure 2.
Type of political dynasty

Source: KPPOD (2017)

- The implementation of regional autonomy pays attention to democracy, justice, equity and potential of regional diversity.
- The implementation of regional autonomy is based on broad, real and responsible autonomy.
- The implementation of broad and comprehensive regional autonomy is located in regional and municipal areas, while provinces are limited in regional autonomy.
- The implementation of regional autonomy must be in accordance with the state's constitution, so that the relationship between central, regional and inter-regional affairs is maintained.
- The implementation of regional autonomy should further enhance autonomy of the autonomous regions and hence in districts and municipalities there is no more administrative territory.
- The implementation of regional autonomy should further enhance the role and function of the legislative body, both the oversight function and the budget function, and the administration of the regional government.
- The implementation of co-administration tasks is not only from the government to the regions but also from local governments to villages with financing, facilities and infrastructure and human resources by reporting the implementation and being accountable to the commission.

Therefore, the Regional Government is given the authority to determine programs and activities which are appropriate to the needs of the community including fiscal, administrative and political aspects (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1999; Abimanyu and Megantara, 2009 in Nurhemi, 2015). The aim of delegation of authority in the implementation of regional autonomy is to improve the welfare of society, equity, justice, democratization and respect for local culture with attention to the potential and diversity of the region (Deddy and Solihin, 2004). Besides that, Ray and Goodpaster (2003) quoted in Ismanto (2011) illustrated local governments in the era of implementation of regional autonomy such as “spending machine”.

Act No. 33/2004 on Regional Government directs the acceleration of the realization of the people's welfare. The influence of regional autonomy on poverty determines the direction of

development in the level of independence of a region. By the existence of regional autonomy, the regions have the authority to make local policies to provide services and improve the welfare of the community, so that regions have more freedom in planning, implementing and evaluating programs for poverty alleviation.

The belief is based on an assumption that decentralization will bring government closer to the community so that the government will focus and develop policies relevant to its regional problems. In addition, decentralization will encourage the creation of responsible governance and high accountability due to the proximity of government to the community, thus encouraging the creation of direct policy controls. More precisely, decentralization is the policy to overcome the problems of poverty, public service and corrupt behavior of public institutions (Hapsah and Mas'udi, 2012).

3.3 Reality of political dynasty, regional autonomy and poverty in Indonesia

The regional autonomy prevailing since 2001 has provided social space to the democratization of regional development. The broad mechanism of granting authority to regions in the financial field is expected to enable local governments to increase their financial potential so that revenues can be increased to the greatest extent possible, but broad authority to the region is also like a double-edged sword, in which greater authority in the economic and political sphere provides space to the emergence of corrupt practices, the more the emergence of the phenomenon of political dynasties that can hamper regional development.

The pattern of local governance can also determine the sustainability of the regional development process. Just as Engarmen and Sokolof (2001) argued that certain political and legal arrangements reflect the relationship of political power among the ruling elite and may vary over time with changes in the balance of power in society, in this case the laws governing regional autonomy; there are several rules that allow the elite to build dynasties or abuse of authority. Revocation of prohibition for incumbent family (Article 7r, Act No. 8 of 2015) was made by the Constitutional Court (Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 33/PUU-XII/2015), stating that Article 7r is contradictory to Article 28J (2) of the 1945 Constitution to the practice of political dynasties.

Querubin (2011) argued that there is a strong motivation to fight for family dynasties through political dynasty, so that they must bear the process of forming political dynasties for economic power, the motivation of which undermines democracy. In addition, the political system can create the prevalence of dynastic politicians, so that it is the political system that has created the dynastic continuity itself. Martin Rosi in Pasan (2013), found that there are channels that lead to the formation of a political dynasty, the "family." The introduction of surnames can form political dynasties within government institutions, or by familiarizing the family name there is a tendency to form political dynasties within government institutions.

One form of political dynasty that often occurs in Indonesia is the type of regeneration (vertical), in which the Head of the Region bequeaths his position to one of the relatives or family. In general, dynastic patterns show the regents replaced by their close relatives even though through direct election; the practice shows the existence of political and economic domination by a few groups, as Samudro (2013) explained about the principle of hegemony about the structural relationship between the core component and the peripheral component, i.e. stronger or core groups always dominate and exploit the underlying group (semi-peripherals and peripherals). In this case, it is the presence of local elites who dominate both economically and politically in the region.

By looking at the list of regions with the regeneration-type political dynasties (Table I), it indicates that some regions in Indonesia show the regional autonomy system actually create

Province	Region	Function	Relationship	Start function	Last function*
South Sumatra	Banyuasin	Regent	Father	2003	2013
		Regent	Son	2013	Present
Banten	Tangerang Reg	Regent	Father	2003	2013
		Regent	Son	2013	Present
West Java	Cimahi	Regent	Father	2002	2012
		Regent	Son	2012	Present
West Java	Bandung Reg	Regent	Father	2000	2010
		Regent	Son-in-law	2010	Present
Central Java	Klaten	Regent	Husband	2005	2015
		Regent	Wife	2016	Present
Special Region of Yogyakarta	Bantul	Regent	Husband	1998	2010
East Java	Probolinggo Reg	Regent	Wife	2010	2015
		Regent	Husband	2003	2013
East Java	Kediri Reg	Regent	Wife	2013	Present
		Regent	Husband	1999	2009
East Java	Bangkalan	Regent	Wife	2009	Present
		Regent	Father	2003	2013
South Sulawesi	Takalar	Regent	Son	2013	Present
		Vice Regent	Father	2002	2012
Central Sulawesi	Tolitoli	Regent	Son	2012	Present
		Regent	Father	1999	2010
Moluccas	Central Moluccas	Regent	Son	2010	Present
		Regent	Brother	2002	2012
		Regent	Brother	2012	Present

Note: *The end of the term of office of the previous regent and the start of the next regent position which has a familial relationship (there is leadership without pause)

Source: Local Government Website, 2017

Table I.
List of areas indicated by political dynasties (regeneration type/vertical)

the regional ruling elites, reinforced by the Court's Decision on the retraction of the incumbent family ban (Article 7r, Act no. 8 Year 2015), with some areas, in 1999, led by one family (regency of Kediri, Bantul and Tolitoli). Thus, the principle of hegemony that occurs in the area of regional autonomy can be shown by political and economic domination that resulted in a region led by one family in the long period.

In line with [Tanzi \(1995\)](#) and [Hoffman \(2002\)](#), the regional autonomy system can provide an opportunity for political dynasties through decentralization policies or regulations (especially political and administrative), which create local elites that dominate politically and economically as described in the chart below: [\(Figure 3\)](#)

The terms regional autonomy and decentralization have their respective roles. The term autonomy refers to the political aspect, whereas decentralization is more likely to be an administrative aspect, although both are integral parts ([Rashid 2000](#) in [Iskandar, 2015](#)). Direct regional head elections (Law No. 9/2015) and post-cancellation of ban for incumbent families (Article 7r, Law No. 8 of 2015) in the era of regional autonomy has had an impact on the emergence of political dynasties ([Table I](#)).

In political ethics, government by one family is not good because the political dynasty is indicated as the cause of corruption and poverty, although democracy has no restrictions on political rights, because ethics can be understood as a set of value systems against something considered good and behavioral guidelines in society ([Holbrook and Meier, 1993](#) quoted in [Hastiyanto, 2017](#)). In the context of ethics, political dynasties can occur during the absence of corruption–collusion–nepotism (KKN) behavior; if there is KKN, then it is an

ethical violation by the local government because the government ethics mandates officials have a high sense of concern in providing services to the public and ready to account if violated. The ethics in question is to realize a clean, efficient and effective government so as to improve the welfare of the society.

In addition, if there is a local elite who dominates both economically and politically in the region, it will create a dynastic politics (Principle of Hegemony), so in reality the direct election of regional heads is not fair, as expressed by Dal Bó *et al.* (2009) that political dynasties raised concerns that inequality in the distribution of political forces can reflect the imperfection of democracy, meaning that candidates derived from political dynasties have the advantage of either the resources or the elite political network, the power that leads the electorate (Suharto *et al.*, 2017).

As it looks at poverty levels (Table II) in the transitional period of dynastic leadership (2005-2015), where the period of the year shows leadership regeneration, there appears to be a decrease in poverty even though the majority of political dynasties are still in the category of poor areas. If based on the national poverty index (Indonesia), then from 12 regions indicated by regeneration political dynasties, 8 regions are poor regional categories.

In the essence of regional autonomy, local governments are expected to find out indigenous financial resources to support the running of the governance system, as indicated by the Fiscal Decentralization Degree (DDF), where DDF can be defined as the ability of local governments to increase own-source revenue (PAD) to finance development, so the higher the DDF ratio the higher the ability of local governments to support regional autonomy (Musgrave, 1980; Hikmah, 1999; quoted in Mulyanto, 2007). Gaffar (2000) explained that the mechanism of granting wide authority to regions in the financial sector should be more emphasized in the relevant law so that by broad authority, the income can be increased as much as possible, of course still considering the potential of the region and the ability of local governments in taking the initiative to discover new financial resources or potential sources of funds to explore and develop. A region is said to be able to run regional autonomy if it has the following characteristics:

- the existence of regional financial capability, meaning that the region has an authority in finding out financial resources to finance the implementation of government; and
- ability to minimize dependence on the central government.

Table II shows that the percentage of DDF is low during 2005-2015, meaning that no one in the political dynasty area is ready in the implementation of regional autonomy. The length




Figure 3.
Plot of the creation of political dynasty in regional autonomy era

Region	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average
<i>Banyuasin</i>												
DDF	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	4	6	3
P_o	20.2	19.7	17.8	15.4	13.7	12.4	11.7	11.3	12.3	11.9	12.5	14
<i>Tangerang Reg.</i>												
DDF	17	16	15	16	19	19	22	23	24	36	39	22
P_o	7.6	8.3	7.2	7.4	6.6	7.2	6.4	5.7	5.8	5.3	5.7	7
<i>Cimahi</i>												
DDF	15	14	13	13	13	14	17	13	17	18	19	15
P_o	8.4	7.4	7.3	8.4	7.1	7.4	7.2	6.7	5.6	5.5	5.8	7
<i>Bandung Reg.</i>												
DDF	12	8	8	10	10	9	11	11	14	16	16	11
P_o	13.3	15.2	13.1	9.4	8.3	9.3	9.0	8.3	7.9	7.7	8.0	10
<i>Klaten</i>												
DDF	6	5	3	5	6	7	5	5	5	6	8	6
P_o	22.5	23.0	22.3	21.7	11.5	17.5	18.0	16.7	15.6	14.6	14.9	18
<i>Bantul</i>												
DDF	8	7	6	5	8	10	12	10	13	16	17	10
P_o	18.2	20.3	19.4	18.5	17.6	16.1	17.3	17.0	16.5	15.9	16.3	18
<i>Probolinggo Reg.</i>												
DDF	5	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	7	8	9	6
P_o	26.1	28.1	27.4	30.1	27.7	25.2	23.5	22.2	21.2	20.4	20.8	25
<i>Kediri Reg.</i>												
DDF	6	6	5	7	6	6	5	6	8	10	13	7
P_o	17.6	19.3	19.0	18.9	17.1	15.5	14.4	13.7	13.2	12.8	12.9	16
<i>Bangkalan</i>												
DDF	7	5	5	5	5	5	4	6	7	7	8	6
P_o	33.8	33.5	31.6	32.7	30.5	28.1	26.2	24.7	23.2	22.4	22.6	28
<i>Takalar</i>												
DDF	5	3	3	3	5	8	7	6	5	6	11	6
P_o	14.9	14.1	13.8	12.7	11.1	11.2	10.0	9.6	10.4	9.6	9.6	12
<i>Tolitoli</i>												
DDF	4	3	4	4	5	6	5	4	5	3	5	4
P_o	21.5	24.1	22.2	19.7	17.8	16.2	15	14.1	13.9	13.1	13.6	17
<i>Central Moluccas</i>												
DDF	2	1	2	2	2	3	3	1	3	3	4	2
P_o	37.1	38.2	36.0	32.6	30.5	28.4	25.2	24.1	22.2	21.4	22.2	29
P_o (Indonesia)	17.4	16.7	16.0	17.8	16.6	15.4	14.2	13.3	12.5	11.7	11.4	11.3

Table II.
Degree of fiscal
decentralization and
regional poverty
index of the
regenerative political
dynasty 2005-2015
(in %)

Notes: DDF (Fiscal Decentralization Degree); P_o (Poverty index)
Source: Regional Government Budget (APBD), Central Bureau of Statistic (BPS)

of leadership of political dynasties does not make the local government innovate to cut the level of dependence on the central government, whereas a long period of leadership should be best utilized in implementing policies that are able to increase PAD effectively and efficiently.

Therefore, the pattern of governance that produces government policies determines economic performance that will affect poverty levels. The pattern of implications of political dynamics of poverty can be described as follows: (Figure 4)

According to Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011), the decline in poverty and inequality in income distribution is a direct and indirect impact of fiscal decentralization policies in which local governments play an important role through open and direct policies, meaning that government policy (political dynasty) determines the economic performance which affects the poverty level. The delegation of authority from the central to the local government is closely linked to the principle of contradiction, in which contradictions are related to the pattern of socioeconomic transformation as a result of dominant institutional change (Foster, 2005; O'Hara, 2008 quoted in Samudro, 2013). In the case of the political dynasty indicated by poverty, if the decision of the policy prioritizes family interest over social interest then it will increase poverty.

Referring to the principle of circular cumulative causation, Myrdal in Samudro *et al.* (2015) explained that if dynasties through government policy can optimally utilize the economy (in this case the budget management and economic potential of the regional autonomy era), it will improve welfare and reduce poverty, so the government must intervene through policy so that the economic activities that come do not gather or clustered in a particular area or group. In other words, the circular in poverty is cumulative because the development benefits in aggregate with its spread effect does not necessarily occur because of institutional constraints in distributing those benefits (Table III).

The socioeconomic performance occurring in the political districts shows that during the era of regional autonomy the average economic growth was quite high between 4.9 per cent and 7.6 per cent, but the poverty rate was still high (national average 11.3 per cent, Table II) with a relatively low level of disparity.

3.4 Political dynasty and poverty of the autonomous region

Restriction on the participation of family members of an end of service regent to run for office is difficult, Article 28j of the 1945 Constitution guarantees the recognition and respect of the rights and freedoms of others and to fulfill fair demands based on moral judgment, religious values and security, in a democratic society which means the freedom of politics of citizens has been guaranteed, so the decision of the Constitutional Court about the retraction of the incumbent family ban (Article 7r, Act No. 8 of 2015) is correct. Therefore, the prevention of political dynasties cannot be done by regulation, but all return to society as a determinant of democratization.

By the existence of Act No. 12/2008 (amendment to Act No. 32/2004) and Act No. 9/2015 (amendment to Act No. 23/2014) on Regional Government resulted in a direct election system of regional heads, so that in accordance with the theory of public choice, explaining that politics in the form of democracy gives space for mutual exchange among communities, political parties and bureaucrats. In that context, voters are positioned as collective goods (public), while the government as a provider of public policy, then the public can feel




Figure 4.
Impact of political
dynasties on poverty

Table III.
Socioeconomic performance indicators in political dynasty (regeneration type) 2005-2015 (average)

Region of political dynasty (Regency/City)	Socioeconomic performance indicators		
	GDP (%)	Poverty index (%)	Gini index
Banyuasin	5.4	14.4	0.32
Tangerang Reg.*	5.7	6.6	0.35
Cimahi*	5.4	7	0.34
Bandung Reg*	5.6	10	0.33
Klaten	5.5	18	0.29
Bantul	4.9	17.6	0.24
Probolinggo Reg	5.1	24.8	0.30
Kediri Reg	5.3	15.9	0.29
Bangkalan	5.6	28.1	0.30
Takalar*	7.6	11.5	**
Tolitoli	6.7	17.4	0.35
Central Moluccas	5.4	28.9	0.33

Notes: *Non-poor category (see Table IV); **Data not available, but the Gini index at the province level reaches 0.41

Source: Central of Bureau Statistic (data processed)

whether a government is worth continuing or in the next period. In addition, the era of regional autonomy that includes fiscal, administrative and political aspects enables the ruling elites to always consider the power and social structures that live in society, especially targeted communities, because the decentralized era of decentralized autonomy provides a great space for the community in determining public affairs and participation mechanisms in local democratic procedures (Hapsah and Mas'udi, 2012).

The question is whether regional autonomy creates a strong political dynasty and does regional autonomy actually increase poverty especially in the area of political dynasties? Referring to Table I, it appears that the start of dynastic leadership began before the era of direct elections in 2005 and continued after the direct elections, so that the decentralization system provided space to build a political dynasty in accordance with that expressed by Tanzi (1995) and Hofman (2002) that regional autonomy poses the risk of full control by local elites and the birth of local ruling elites or it indicates the presence of local elite dominance both economically and politically in the region (Figure 3), but it does not represent the impact of regional autonomy on the birth of political dynasties because of the amounts indicated by political dynasties – only 58 regions (12 regeneration-type regions) of 542 autonomous regions in Indonesia.

In addition, the poverty index data exposed in Table II indicates that the autonomy era had an impact on the decrease of poverty in the area of regeneration political dynasty. This is evidenced by the decrease in the percentage of poverty index from year to year, although not yet out of the category of poor areas (based on national index) or only four regions from 12 regions that belong to non-poor areas. However, the average dynasties count is able to reduce poverty each year (Table IV).

The answer to the issues contained in this paper can be concluded that autonomy does not increase poverty in the area of political dynasties; it is capable of suppressing the percentage of poverty (the area of regeneration-type political dynasty). From 12 sample regions, there are nine regions that have reduced poverty to below 20 per cent. Probolinggo, Bangkalan and Central Moluccas districts have become regions where the poverty rate is still above 20 per cent. However, these three areas during the period of 2005-2015 were able to reduce significantly or shorten the distance to the national poverty level. Bangkalan

regency in 2005 with its poverty index at 33.8 per cent (2005) reduced it to 22.6 per cent (2015), and Central Moluccas reduced it from 37.1 per cent (2005) to 22.5 per cent (2015).

However, in the era of autonomy, the socioeconomic performance of regional political dynasties (poor areas) also shows that the average GDP is high, with high poverty rates and relatively low level of disparity, which means unequal income distribution because contributions to GDP are still dominated by the wealthy; on the contrary, the contribution of the poor to the GDP is still small so that although it can reduce the poverty but the poverty rates and Gini index are still high. And region of political dynasties (non-poor areas) show that high GDP is followed by low levels of poverty and Gini index, so there is an even distribution of income (Table III).

4. Closing and policy suggestion

The debate over political dynasties raises the notion that political dynasties create poverty or political dynasties are worse in poverty alleviation, but this research shows that the era of regional autonomy provides space for the emergence of the practice of political dynasties, especially in regions where political dynasties of regeneration type are supposed to occur during periods of leadership but the length of leadership does not make the regional leadership in the political dynasty able to increase income (own-source revenue) so that the essence of regional autonomy on regional self-reliance is not achieved.

The opinion that political dynasties created poverty did not occur in this study, but the area of political dynasty is identical with poverty; it is indicated by the fact that 8 out of 12 sample regions are poor areas. However, the average political dynasty of regeneration type can reduce poverty every year, which means that the era of regional autonomy can suppress poverty, especially in the field of regeneration-type political dynasty. It means there is no effect of dynastic practice on poverty, where political dynasties are able to reduce the percentage of poverty steadily even though they have not been able to get out of the poor category, but at least shorten the distance with the national average poverty, with the record that income distribution in majority of the political dynasty regions (poor area) is uneven, indicated by socioeconomic performance indicators where GDP is relatively high but poverty rates are still high and disparities are low.

The emergence of political dynasties in the era of regional autonomy should provide a warning to the central government and society as a determinant of the passage of democracy. Arrangement of restrictions on the political rights of citizens (incumbent families) is not possible by regulation (limitation of political rights) because it is

Non-poor		Poor	
Region	*▲(▼) (%)	Region	*▲(▼) (%)
Tangerang	(0.20)	Banyuasin	(0.7)
Cimahi	(0.30)	Klaten	(0.80)
Bandung	(0.50)	Bantul	(0.20)
Takalar	(0.50)	Probolinggo	(0.50)
		Kediri	(0.50)
		Bangkalan	(1.10)
		Tolitoli	(0.80)
		Central Moluccas	(1.50)

Table IV.

Categories of poverty level in political dynasty region (regeneration type)

Note: *Increase (Decrease), average per year

contradictory in constitution. Therefore, there are policy recommendations related to the election of regional heads, namely:

4.1 Socialization and education

Socialization and education about the political dynasty to the community (especially the novice voters) in the determination of the regional head (direct regional election) needs to be done to break the political dynasty through the election, although not all dynasties are bad and dynasties will collapse by itself as in Bantul District, in 2015.

It is expected that the community/novice voters can sort out their own candidate leaders based on their track record and quality logically because they are “swing voters” in elections and are expected to stem the practice of political dynasties and eliminate the political dynasty culture.

4.2 Regulation of qualification of candidates for regional head

In obtaining a position in the agency or position, qualification must be very important, for example to occupy a position in civil servants, it needs to be fulfilled in the form of employment span. Similarly, candidates for regional heads need a qualification in terms of both formal and non-formal education, experience leading an organization or institution, a good track record of both achievement and criminal record (never involved in serious cases of corruption, drugs or other crimes at least the past 10 years).

4.3 Revamping the regional head election system

Improving the electoral system needs to be done, as the autonomy era with direct election system is an expensive political system and tends to give rise to money politics and corrupt behavior or political control by large capital owners. So that it would be better for local elections to apply only to the local level, whereas Level II Region (Dati II) is returned to the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) by adding a faction of community groups (community representatives) so that the monitoring of money politics is easier because of the smaller scope of supervision.

Based on data exposure, the regional autonomy system is actually able to reduce the poverty rate, especially in areas indicated by the political dynasty of regeneration type even though not maximally. Efficiency in the management of local budgets needs to be considered and improved so that the local policies related to poverty can be done well and the region is able to get out of the poverty zone. In addition, the success or failure of local autonomy is also not separated from the level of regional readiness in financing, as measured by the ratio of DDF.

4.4 Innovation of own source revenue through a community-based economy

DDF scores are low especially in the area of political dynasty, showing that during the period the related government has no innovation in increasing own-source revenue, so it takes the figure of a leader who has an innovative vision mission. Local governments need to encourage community-based economic sectors or own-source revenue optimization should make the regions better able to concentrate in the empowerment of local economic power, so that the direct impact of economic growth in addition to the increase in local revenue is also felt directly by the community.

In the era of autonomy, local governments need to encourage SMEs (small medium enterprises) or community-based industries through funding that will produce goods/services from the public to the community, but must be endorsed or protected by regulations

(perda) in the public interest and accompanied by good facilities/public services; the principle of contradiction that often exists in the territory of political dynasties does not occur where the interests of the family are more important than the social interests, so the resources that should be used for regional development to improve the welfare of the community and the eradication of poverty are controlled by a handful of elites or certain groups.

Punish and reward needs to be given by the central government and the community to the head of an active region; when the results of the government can be felt directly by the community, it is proper that the head of the region is eligible to be re-elected as soon as in the next period on the contrary.

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